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The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application layer signaling protocol for the cre-
ation, modification and termination of multimedia sessions and VoIP calls with one or
more participants. While SIP operates in highly dynamic environments, in the current
version its authorization support is based on traditional access control models. The main
problem these models face is that they were designed many years ago, and under some
circumstances they tend to be inadequate in modern highly dynamic environments. Usage
Control (UCON), instead, is a model that supports the same operations as traditional access
control models do, but it further enhances them with novel ones. In previous work, an
architecture supporting continuous authorizations in SIP, based on the UCON model, was
presented. In this article, an authorization support implementing the whole UCON model,
including authorizations, obligations and conditions, has been integrated in a SIP system.
Moreover, a testbed has been set up to experimentally evaluate the performance of the
proposed security mechanism.
ª 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction heterogeneity. This environment, however, will demand anNowadays, an emerging proliferation of multimedia applica-
tions is observed, and networks like 3G even define a separate
subsystem for managing multimedia content delivery,
namely IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) (3GPP, 2010). Themain
characteristic of IMS is that it is based on protocols with open
specifications, like the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
(Rosenberg et al., 2002) for managing multimedia sessions,
and Diameter (Calhoun et al., 2003) for authentication,
authorization and accounting. It is foreseen that the very
same protocols will play a central role in Next Generation
Networks (NGNs) managing multimedia content delivery over
interconnected networks presenting a high degree ofFP7-ICT project NESSo
rant agreement n. 256980
69; fax: þ39 050 315 2593.
t.cnr.it, gkar@aegean.gr (G
ier Ltd. All rights reserveappropriate access control model in order to handle its highly
dynamic characteristics.
Traditional access control models like Mandatory Access
Control, Discretionary Access Control and Role-Based Access
Control exist in the literature for a long time. Each of these
models is based on a different approach, but a common
feature is that they all perform the authorization decisions at
request time only, i.e., before a subject accesses an object. The
Usage Controlmodel (UCON) (Park and Sandhu, 2004), instead,
besides supporting all the concepts present in the aforemen-
tioned models, introduces new features, the most notable of
which are mutable attributes and continuous enforcement of
the security policy for the whole lifetime of an access.S (Network of Excellence on Engineering Secure Future Internet
.
. Karopoulos), paolo.mori@iit.cnr.it (P. Mori), fabio.martinelli@iit.
d.
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probable for attributes, such as user’s reputation, paired with
subjects, objects and environment to change their value, even
during the course of a session (mutable attributes). Therefore,
an authorization decision based on mutable attributes may
not hold any more while the access is in progress, thus
violating the security policy of the system. In these circum-
stances, traditional access control models are inadequate,
whereas UCON supports the continuous re-evaluation of the
security policy to interrupt unauthorized accesses while in
progress.
In a previous work (Martini et al., 2011) the concept of on-
going authorizations on network resources was presented.
We extended it in Karopoulos et al. (2012) with amore detailed
presentation focused on SIP systems. In this article, we inte-
grate an authorization system implementing the whole UCON
model in a SIP system, with continuous enforcement of au-
thorizations, obligations and conditions. We extended the
prototype used in our previous work to support ongoing ob-
ligations as well, in order to experimentally evaluate the
performance of our framework. Themost important benefit of
the proposed framework is the re-evaluation of the security
policy during the exercise of access rights; this enhances
system security avoiding the continuation of accesses when
the corresponding rights expire.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the motivation and the contribution of this paper.
In Section 3 an overview of the UCONmodel is given, while in
Section 4 the operation of SIP is briefly presented. The pro-
posedmethod of continuous authorizations and obligations in
SIP is analyzed in Section 5, followed by the description of our
prototype and experimental results in Section 6. Related work
is presented in Section 7 and Section 8 includes conclusions
and future work.2. Motivation and contribution
Multimedia sessions can be long lasting, i.e., manyminutes or
even hours (like traditional phone or video conference calls).
However, even if the initial access to a SIP system has been
authorized, some factors can change while the call is in
progress in such a way that the corresponding access right
does not hold any more. In this case, if traditional access
control models are being used, the call will continue if none of
the participants interrupts it, thus violating the security pol-
icy. For example, a free SIP system could require that an
advertisement window is displayed on the caller’s device
while the call is in progress. Hence, if the caller closes this
window while the call is still in progress, the security policy is
violated. The UCON model can be adopted in SIP systems in
order to regulate the usage of network resources in such cases.
To address this issue, the UCON model enables us to define a
security policy thatmust be satisfied for the whole duration of
the SIP call. This means that the call is interrupted by the
security enforcing mechanism as soon as this policy is not
satisfied any more. For example, a predicate of the policy
could state that the user reputation must be greater than T
during the call. If the user reputation falls below the threshold
T when the call is still in progress, the call is interrupted.Besides enhancing SIP systems security, this approach also
allows to save network resources avoiding the continuation of
unauthorized calls.
The main contribution of this article is the design of a
complete framework implementing a UCON based authori-
zation support for SIP systems, i.e., a framework supporting
authorizations, obligations, conditions and continuous policy
enforcement. It provides a detailed description of the autho-
rization support architecture and its integrationwithin the SIP
system, focusing on the aspects concerning the implementa-
tion of the UCON model peculiarities, such as continuous
enforcement of the policy and revocation of ongoing SIP ses-
sions. Moreover, the article presents a complete set of exper-
iments that evaluate the delay introduced by the proposed
authorization mechanism.3. Usage control
The UCON model, introduced in Park and Sandhu (2004),
encompasses and extends traditional access control models
introducing mutable attributes and new decision factors
besides authorizations, i.e., obligations and conditions.
Mutable attributes change their values as a consequence of
the access decision process, and this could affect the same
access or other accesses that are in progress. For instance,
the value of the reputation attribute is decreased every time
the subject tries to access an object but does not have the
related rights. Traditional attributes (i.e., immutable attri-
butes), instead, are modified only through administrative
actions. For instance, the role attribute is updated when the
subject gets a career advancement. Since mutable attributes
can be updated during the usage of an object, in the
following we show that each decision factor can be evalu-
ated before (as in traditional models) and/or during the
usage of the object (continuous control). Re-evaluating the
access right when the access is in progress and interrupting
this access when the related right is no more valid reduces
the risk of misuse of resources.
Authorization predicates are evaluated to determine
whether a subject requesting access to an object holds the
corresponding right. This decision making phase takes into
account subject/object attributes, and the action that the
subject requested to perform on the object. The UCON model
defines two categories of authorizations: pre-Authorizations
(preA), where the decision phase is performed when the sub-
ject requests to access the object, and ongoing-Authorizations
(onA), where the decision phase is performed while the access
is in progress, in a continuous fashion.
Obligations are predicates that state whether certain re-
quirements have been fulfilled in order to access objects. Pre-
oBligation (preB) predicates verifywhether some requirements
have been fulfilled before the access, while ongoing-
oBligations (onB) continuously check that the requirements
are fulfilled while the access is in progress.
Conditions are requirements that do not depend on subjects
or objects. They evaluate environmental or system status (e.g.,
current time or current location) to decide whether to allow
access or not. A notable difference with respect to authori-
zations and obligations is that condition variables are not
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 9 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 4 0 6e4 1 8408mutable and the evaluation of conditions cannot modify
subject/object attributes.Fig. 2 e SIP access control architecture based on UCON.4. The session initiation protocol
SIP (Rosenberg et al., 2002), is an application layer signaling
protocol used in multimedia sessions and VoIP calls with one
ormore participants. SIP is used to set up a call only, and helps
end users to negotiate the characteristics of the session.
In the classic operation flow, after the first part of the
protocol where the caller locates the callee, the protocol is in
essence a P2P one and users send SIP messages directly to
each other. To terminate a call, any of the two users can send a
BYE message directly to the other, utilizing SIP once again.
In the alternative operation flow, shown in Fig. 1, end users
do not communicate directly with each other. The Back-to-
Back User Agent (B2BUA) is a component of the SIP frame-
work which operates between two communicating User
Agents (UAs) and controls all signaling exchanged between
them. It is not always present in a SIP architecture and this is
the reason why it is not included in the classic SIP architec-
ture. However, it is a basic element in the proposed scheme
and this is why a brief overview of its operation is given here.
From the point of view of the calling SIP UA, a B2BUA acts
as a user agent server (UAS) which receives requests and
forwards them to the called SIP UA acting as a user agent
client (UAC). This way, the two communicating end points
never exchange SIP messages directly between them; if this
element is present, even the call termination messages pass
through the B2BUA as shown in Fig. 1. The benefits of using a
B2BUA is that it can provide call management for the whole
duration of a SIP dialog and full control over the calls.5. Usage control in multimedia delivery
5.1. Architecture
Fig. 2 shows the general architecture of a system that provides
multimedia services based on SIP together with an access
control system based on the UCONmodel. The lines representFig. 1 e An alternative operation overview for SIP.the exchange of SIP messages while the dotted lines represent
other protocols. In the proposed system all SIP signaling
passes through a B2BUA in order to have full control over SIP
sessions.
In the proposed architecture, the approach described in
Yavatkar et al. (2000) is followed. According to this, there are
two main entities: the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and the
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The PDP is the component
where the decision process is performed, and access decisions
are taken, while the PEP has the responsibility to actually
enforce these decisions by accepting or denying requests
made by end users. Here an access control server, like a AAA
server in de Laat et al. (2000), plays the role of a PDP; the PEP is
co-located with the B2BUA which accepts session initiation
requests from UAs.
The PDP contacts some attribute servers to retrieve upda-
ted values of subject/object attributes like user roles and user
reputation. In particular, the PDP interacts with the Policy
Information Point (PIP), that is the component of the autho-
rization system that is in charge of interacting with the attri-
bute servers, knowing their specific protocols.
When a SIP request arrives, the PDP invokes the PIP sub-
scribing only for the attributes related to the user of this
particular request. The PIP contacts the Attribute Servers to
retrieve the current values of these attributes for a pre-
evaluation of the security policy, and monitors these attri-
butes to detect when their value changes, in order to trigger
the PDP for a re-evaluation of the security policy. If the Attri-
bute Server supports subscription, the PIP simply waits for a
message from the Attribute Server. Instead, if the Attribute
Server does not provide any subscription mechanism, the PIP
periodically retrieves the updated values of user’s attributes,
and triggers the policy re-evaluation only if at least one of
these is different from the previously collected ones. Attri-
butes are updated as a consequence of the evaluation of the
security policy that includes the update commands.
In other cases, specific obligations should be met before or
during the provision of SIP services. As a representative
example, in our architecture we suppose that obligations are
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 3 9 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 4 0 6e4 1 8 409realized throughmultimedia advertisements. In Fig. 2 the PDP
is a UCON-aware server responsible for checking whether
obligations should be met or not and a SIP Advertisement
Server is utilized to deliver advertisement content to the user.
When the B2BUA/PEP receives an “obligation needed”
response from the PDP it creates a new SIP session between
the caller and the multimedia server for delivering the
advertisement.
5.2. Security policy
To express security policies we adopted the PolPA language.
PolPA is a process algebra based language that allows to write
history based security policies according to the UCON model
(Martinelli andMori, 2010; Martinelli et al., 2005). In particular,
it exploits some composition operators to define the allowed
behavior, i.e., a) the order in which security relevant actions
can be performed, b) which authorizations, obligations and
conditions must be satisfied to allow a given action, c) which
authorizations, obligations and conditions must hold during
the execution of actions, and d) which updates must be per-
formed as a consequence of those actions. Roughly speaking,
these operators allow to represent a sequence of actions, the
alternative choice among a set of actions, the parallel execu-
tion of a set of actions, and the iterative or replicated execu-
tion of actions. For example, two or more actions must be
executed in the same order as they appear in the policy if they
are composed through a seq operator. Two ormore actions can
be executed alternatively or in parallel if they are related to an
or or par composition operator, respectively. Moreover, PolPA
allows to specify some predicates involving action’s parame-
ters and attributes of the user, the resource and the environ-
ment that need to be satisfied in order to proceed with the
execution of the actions that follow the predicates in the
policy.We use the commands tryaccess(s, o, r), permitaccess(s, o,
r), denyaccess(s, o, r), endaccess(s, o, r), and revokeaccess(s, o, r) to
represent the phases of an access, where s represents the
name of the user that performs the action, o represents theFig. 3 e SIP pre-Authorizaname of the resource that is accessed, and r represents the
specific security relevant action that implements the access
along with its parameters. In particular, tryaccess(s, o, r) rep-
resents the request of the user s to perform an access, permi-
taccess(s, o, r)/denyaccess(s, o, r) represent the decision taken by
the authorization system to allow/deny the access, and revo-
keaccess(s, o, r) represent the decision taken by the authori-
zation system to interrupt an access that is in progress.
In the following sections we will show some examples for
Authorizations and Obligations; we don’t show any example
for Conditions since both the policy and the message ex-
change is similar to the pre-Authorization case. For a detailed
description of PolPA language refer to Martinelli and Mori
(2010).
5.3. Authorizations
5.3.1. Pre-authorizations
In accordance to Section 3, Fig. 3 shows an example of preA in
SIP, where the authorization procedure is executed as usual:
any SIP call should be authorized before it is actually per-
formed. Hence, the request of a UA for the creation of a new
SIP session is authorized following the procedure in Fig. 3, and
only if the PDP response is positive the two UAs start the ex-
change of multimedia data.
SIP session termination in preA scenarios is initiated when
one of the two communicating edges sends a BYE message;
this action triggers the procedure shown in Fig. 3 (messages
22e26). When the session is terminated the PEP embedded in
the B2BUA informs the PDP (message 26).
A simple policy example implementing the preA model is
shown in Table 1. This policy allows the execution of the call
only if the reputation of the caller when the access request is
performed is greater than a given value R.
The execution of a SIP call has been represented in PolPA
using the security relevant action sip_call, whose parameters
are the name of the receiver and the ID of the call, that starts
when the SIP INVITE message is sent, and ends with the SIPtion based on UCON.
Table 1 e Example of a preA security policy.
tryaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)). 1
[(user.reputation > R)]. 2
permitaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)). 3
( endaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)) 4
or 5
endaccess(recv, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)) 6
); 7
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SIP messages, sending to the PDP the request of the user to
initiate a new call with the tryaccess command, and ending an
existing call with the endaccess command. The first line of the
policy represents the request of the user to initiate a call, and
the permission is granted in line 3 only if the predicate in line 2
is satisfied. This predicate requires that the reputation of the
user is greater than a given value R. In the preA model no
further controls are executed while the call is in progress. The
call can be terminated by any of the communicating users;
line 4 and line 6 of the policy allow, respectively, either the
caller or the receiver to terminate the call.
5.3.2. Ongoing-authorizations
In the onA model, the security policy is checked continuously
while the media session is in progress and, as soon as any
violation is observed, the authorization is revoked and the
access is interrupted. Instead, if no violations occur, sessions
are terminated by users, like in the preA scenario.
Fig. 4 shows a SIP session that is revoked during the media
exchange. The PDP sends a subscription message to the
attribute server (Fig. 4, message 5) to get the current values of
the attributes related to the user that is initiating the SIP call,
and to be notified when these values change. When the PDP is
notified of an attribute update, the security policy is re-
evaluated and if this results to a policy violation, an authori-
zation revocations message is sent by the PDP to the B2BUA
that closes the call (Fig. 4, message 23).Fig. 4 e Authorization revocation whTo revoke the dialog, B2BUA sends two BYE messages, one
to each party and the dialog is terminated when they both
respond with an OKmessage. Table 2 shows a policy example
that extends the one in Table 1 by implementing the onA
model. Again, here the execution of the call is allowed only if
the reputation of the caller is greater that a given value R and
the call is stopped as soon as the value of the caller’s reputa-
tion is lower than R or one of the users terminate the call.
The first three lines represent the initiation of the call and
are the same as in the preA example. After the call initiation
there are two alternatives for terminating a call in progress: it
can either be terminated by one of the users or be revoked by
the PDP. Lines 4 and 6 of the policy represent the first case, in
which one of the two users sends the termination command
to close the call. In the second case, instead, the Attribute
Server notifies the PDP about the updates of the attributes it
subscribed, and the PDP, in turn, re-evaluates the policy. If the
predicate in line 8 is satisfied, the PDP executes the revokeac-
cess command in line 9, that interrupts the execution of the
call.
5.4. Obligations
5.4.1. Pre-obligations
Fig. 5 shows the sequence diagram in the case of preB model,
i.e., when the execution of an obligation is a prerequisite for
the establishment of a SIP session. The solid lines represent
the exchange of SIP messages while the dotted lines represent
other protocols; all SIP signaling passes through a B2BUA for
having full control over SIP sessions.
In this example, the complete execution of an obligation is
needed before the user can continue with themultimedia call.
Fig. 5 presents an examplewhere amultimedia advertisement
has been chosen as the required obligation. Before the user’s
INVITE message is forwarded, a session with the advertise-
ment server is established (message 5), and the user must
watch or hear the advertisement; when the advertisement is
over and the session has been terminated (message 11) theile a SIP session is in progress.
Table 2 e Example of an onA security policy.
tryaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)). 1
[(user.reputation > R)]. 2
permitaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)). 3
( endaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)) 4
or 5
endaccess(recv, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)) 6
or 7
([(user.reputation  R)]. 8
revokeaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id))) 9
); 10
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that, in turn, answers sending the permitaccessmessage to the
PEP (message 13). The PEP enforces the PDP decision for-
warding the INVITE message to its destination (message 14).
Table 3 shows an example of preBmodel policy. This policy
allows the execution of the call only if the user listens to or
watches a given advertisement. As amatter of fact, the tryaccess
in line 1 represents the user request to initiate a new call, that is
authorized by the permitaccess in line 4 only if the execution of
the obligation started by the executeobl command in line 2 is
terminated, i.e., the endobl command has been received (line 3).
The execution of the obligation is enforced by the PEP.
5.4.2. Ongoing-obligations
The sequence diagram in Fig. 6 shows the onB case, where the
execution of an obligation takes place in parallel with the
requested multimedia call. The user initiates a multimedia
call by sending an INVITE message, the PEP requests access
and the PDP responds back that the user should fulfil an
ongoing-Obligation, such as watching an advertisement
message. Then the B2BUA establishes a SIP session between
the user and the advertisement server which should remain
active for the whole period of the requested call between the
two users. When the session between the two users is
terminated, the advertisement session is also terminated. If
the caller terminates the advertisement session while the call
is still in progress, the B2BUA intercepts the termination andFig. 5 e Executing an obligation befinforms the PDPwhich requests the revocation of the call; this
procedure is showed in Fig. 6, and the related policy is showed
in Table 4.
The policy states that the execution of the obligation, rep-
resented by the executeobl command in line 2, starts as soon as
the access request (i.e., the tryaccess command in line 1) is
received, and the access is permitted right after, by the permi-
taccess command in line 3. While the call is in progress, if the
user stops theexecutionof theobligation, the endoblmessage is
sent to the PDP, and the policy interrupts the access by sending
the revokeaccess command to the PEP (see lines 8 and 9).6. Our prototype
In order to experimentally evaluate the performance of the
proposed system an appropriate testbed has been set up
exploiting both in-house developed components andmodified
versions of open source software. This section describes the
architecture and the implementation of the testbed, and
presents a set of experiments that have been performed to
evaluate the delay introduced by the UCON system enforcing
preA, onA, preB and onB policies.
6.1. Testbed architecture
The general architecture of the testbed is shown in Fig. 7. This
testbed is based on the architecture presented in Section 5,
and for each experiment we use the components we need. For
the sake of simplicity, our testbed includes one administrative
domain only, and thus one SIP server. Since a second SIP
server would take part in non measured message exchanges,
having one administrative domain will not affect our results.
A brief analysis of the utilized software and hardware com-
ponents follows.
6.1.1. B2BUA
Sippy (2011) is an open source SIP B2BUA server software
based on Python. Our prototype exploits a modified version of
Sippy embedding a PEP in order to contact the PDP every timeore establishing a SIP session.
Table 3 e Example of a preB security policy.
tryaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)). 1
executeobl(user, adv_id). 2
endobl(user, adv_id). 3
permitaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)). 4
( endaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)) 5
or 6
endaccess(recv, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)) 7
); 8
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that the action is permitted or not, and could also ask the PEP
to enforce obligations before and/or during the call. While the
call is in progress the PEP waits for revocation commands
from the PDP. In fact, PEP supports the revocation of ongoing
sessions by sending BYE messages to the UAs involved in the
session.
6.1.2. SIP proxy server
As SIP Proxy server, the open source SIP Router from the SIP
Router Project (SIP Router, 2011) was utilized, which is a com-
mon development framework supported by similar but previ-
ously independent projects like: SIP Express Router (SER),
Kamailio (OpenSER)andOpenIMSCore.Theyareall basedonthe
SIP Express Router (SER) which is a high performance and con-
figurable SIP server. In this case the configuration file of the
serverwasmodified inorder to forwardall SIP requests toSippy.
6.1.3. Policy decision point
The PDP has been developed in IIT-CNR and supports usage
control policies expressed using PolPA language (see Section
5.2). To implement the interactions between the PEP and the
PDP a proprietary communication protocol was used.
6.1.4. Attribute server
In order to keep the architecture simple, we have chosen not
to use a fully operational attribute server in our experiments.Fig. 6 e Terminating an obligation wInstead, we use an ad-hoc component which modifies attri-
bute values, thus triggering the authorization revocation
procedures. However, this choice does not affect the time re-
sults since the measurement of the delays due to the autho-
rization support starts when the attribute update message is
sent to the PDP, i.e., it does not involve the Attribute Server.
6.1.5. Advertisement server
Our Advertisement Server is a SIP multimedia server which is
responsible for presenting a multimedia advertisement to the
caller during the preB and onB scenarios, and it is implemented
as a SIP User Agent. Our experiments are focused on the SIP
establishment and termination phases, thus the type of
multimedia advertisement does not affect our results.
6.1.6. User agents
The User Agents used on the testbed are based on SIPp (2011)
which is an open source test tool and traffic generator for SIP
written in Cþþ. SIPp operates according to scenarios defined
in XML encoded files which describe simple as well as more
complex call flows. Moreover, SIPp can play the role of a caller
UA (client scenarios) as well as the one of the callee UA (server
scenarios). For our testbed, we had to create appropriate client
and server XML configuration files following the desired call
flows.While SIPp is capable of producing different types of SIP
messages, for our purposes we needed the generation of
INVITE messages. Before, however, the proper routing of the
messages to him, the intended recipient should register his
current point of attachment before. This is accomplished by
using sipsak (2006), a small open source command line tool
used for simple tests on SIP applications and devices. With
sipsak, in our testbed, an appropriate REGISTER message is
send to the SIP Router so that it is aware of the point of
attachment of the callee and able to forward the message.
6.1.7. Machine specifications
We run our experiments exploiting two machines on a local
network. The first machine hosts the SIPp user agentshile a SIP session is in progress.
Table 4 e Example of an onB security policy.
tryaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)). 1
executeobl(user, adv_id). 2
permitaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)). 3
( endaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)) 4
or 5
endaccess(recv, net, sip_call(recv,call_id)) 6
or 7
(endobl(user, adv_id). 8
revokeaccess(user, net, sip_call(recv,call_id))) 9
); 10
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and the scripts for attribute updates. The CPU is a Dual-core
Intel Core 2 6600 running on 2.4 GHz, with 2 GB of memory,
running a 32 bit openSuSE Linux version 11.3 with kernel
version 2.6.34. In the second machine there is a VMWare
player (2011) based Virtual Machine with the implementa-
tion of the PDP. The host machine’s CPU is a Quad-core Intel
Core i5 750 running on 2.67 GHz, with 8 GB of memory,
running a 64 bit Ubuntu Linux version 10.10 with kernel
version 2.6.35; the virtual machine is running a 32 bit
Ubuntu Linux version 9.10 with kernel version 2.6.31 using
1 GB of memory.
6.2. Experiments
We have conducted two distinct sets of experiments for au-
thorizations and obligations. Wireshark (2011) was used for
intercepting all the messages exchanged among the compo-
nents of our testbed.
6.2.1. Authorizations
The first set of experiments is aimed at measuring the delay
introduced by authorizations. In particular, we measured a)
the delay introduced by the preA phase, i.e., the delay for the
initial authorization of a call, and b) the delay of the onA phase,
which is the delay between the time when an attribute update
that causes a security policy violation is issued, and the time
that the respective session(s) is/are actually interrupted. In
other words, this is the period that the call is still active
despite the fact that a policy violation has occurred. Since the
focus of these experiments was to measure the delay intro-
duced by the authorization support only, we skip the
authentication phase in the call set up. The following para-
graphs describe the procedure we followed in order to get
results for three distinct scenarios.Fig. 7 e Our prototype architecture.The experiments were conducted enforcing the simple
policy shown in Table 2, that implements the preA model
allowing the execution of the call only if the reputation of the
caller is greater that a given value R, and implements also the
onA model because the call is stopped as soon as the value of
the caller’s reputation is lower than R.
The first experimentmeasures the delay of authorizing the
execution of a single SIP session, i.e., the time required for
enforcing lines 1e3 of the security policy in Table 2. The re-
sults showed that, on average, the total time to set up a call,
i.e. the interval from the time the caller initiates a call to the
time the SIP device of the callee actually rings, including the
authorization phase, is 19 ms. The average delay of the PDP to
authorize the call, i.e. from themoment that the PEP sends the
authorization request to the PDP until the PDP responds back,
is 2 ms. Hence, the delay due to the authorization phase is
2 ms out of 19, i.e., about 10% of the total delay. This delay
could increase if further authorization predicates are added in
line 2 of the policy, but it does not depend on the number of
active calls. In this case our results demonstrate that the delay
imposed by the adoption of our UCON authorization system is
so small that cannot be perceived by the communicating
parties.
The second experiment measures the time required for
the revocation of calls in progress; this corresponds to lines
8 and 9 of the security policy in Table 2. We suppose that a
user has one active call and, while this call is in progress, his
reputation falls below the minimum value allowed by the
security policy and the PDP revokes the call. In order to
measure the response times of the different components we
have measured the delays of revoking one single session at
a time from a queue of 1, 100, 200, ., 1000 active calls. For
each queue size the experiment has been repeated 100
times, and the average delay was calculated. The results of
this experiment are shown in Fig. 8. The measured times are
computed from the moment the attribute update message
was sent to the PDP until the last OK message regarding the
revoked session was received. Again, in this second exper-
iment the results reveal that no significant delay is
observed; in the worst case the total time required to stop a
session is about 5 ms: less than 2 ms are due to the UCON
authorization system, while the remaining time is due to
the SIP system. Hence, this experiment shows that whenFig. 8 e Mean delay of revoking an active SIP session with
different active call queue sizes.
Fig. 9 e Mean delay of revoking 5 SIP sessions with
different active call queue sizes. Fig. 11 e Mean delay of executing 5 obligations
simultaneously with different active call queue sizes.
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quickly.
The third experiment is similar to the second, but here the
user has 5 active calls. In this case, 5 sessions are revoked and
the delay is measured from the moment the attribute update
message is sent to the PDP until the last OK message con-
cerning the last of the five revoked sessions is received. Again,
this was done 100 times for each size of the active calls queue,
and the mean delay was calculated. The results of the third
experiment are presented in Fig. 9. The figures show that the
total time required to stop 5 calls reaches almost 14 ms in the
worst case. However, the delay due to the UCON authorization
system is a little more than 2ms; hence, the largest part of the
delay is due to SIP operations and it is not added by the pro-
posedmechanism. To sum up, the experimental results in the
case of authorizations demonstrate that the integration of the
UCON authorization system within SIP architectures does not
impose delays that are perceived by the end user, and allows
to quickly interrupt calls when the corresponding rights have
expired.
6.2.2. Obligations
The goal of the second set of experiments is to measure the
delays introduced by the obligation management in the preBFig. 10 e Mean delay of executing an obligation with
different active call queue sizes.and onB scenarios. We have four scenarios in total, two for
each case. Again in this set of experiments we skip the
authentication phase during the call set up phase.
In the first scenario (preB case 1) we enforced the policy in
Table 3 to measure the delay of executing an obligation for a
single SIP session before the actual initiation of the session. In
this scenario user A tries to call user B and the PDP, evaluating
lines 1e3 of the policy, responds back that user A should
watch an advertisement before his call is being set up. As a
matter of fact, the permitaccess command (line 4), that autho-
rizes the call set up, is placed after the endobl command (line
3), that states the natural termination of the execution of the
obligation. Here we only measure the delay for the set up of
the advertisement session leaving out the duration of the
advertisement. In order to measure the response times of the
different components we have measured the delays of setting
up one advertisement session at a time when there are 1, 100,
200, ., 1000 active user calls. The measured times are
computed from the moment the first SIP INVITE message was
sent from user A and includes the delays for setting up the
session between user A and user B, the initiation and termi-
nation of the session between user A and the advertisement
server, and the messages exchanged between the PEP and theFig. 12 e Mean delay of revoking a call after an obligation
was terminated.
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delay was calculated. The results are shown in Fig. 10. In the
worst case, the total delay for the preB scenario is near 8 ms
out of which near 1 msec is due to the PDP operations. Hence,
the delay introduced by the UCON authorization system is
minimal in this case too.
The second scenario (preB case 2) is similar to the first one,
but here user A initiates 5 calls at the same time, thus 5
advertisement sessions should be set up at the same time. The
policy enforced is the one in Table 3. The measured times are
computed from themoment the first call is initiated from user
A until all advertisements have been set up and terminated
and the 5th call has been accepted by the callee. Again, this
experiment was done 100 times, i.e., 100 groups of five ses-
sions were initiated one by one and the mean delay was
calculated. The results of the second scenario are shown in
Fig. 11. Here, a relatively higher total delay is observed which
is around 280 ms in the worst case. However, the PDP delay is
between 6 and 7 ms in all cases. Again, as in previous sce-
narios, the delay introduced by the UCON authorization sys-
tem is low and the total delay is mainly due to SIP operations;
one solution to this problem is the deployment of more than
one SIP servers.
In the third scenario (onB case 1) we enforced the policy in
Table 4. The user A initiates a call to user B; the PDP checks the
security policy and responds that an advertisement video
should be viewed in parallel with the call. The procedure is as
following: user A initiates the call, the PEP requests a decision
from the PDP, the advertisement session is being set up, and
finally the call session is being set up. After a small period of
time user A decides to terminate the advertisement; the PEP
informs the PDP, which responds that the call session should
be terminated. In this scenario wemeasure the delay from the
moment user A terminates the advertisement session until
both the advertisement and the call session have been
terminated. In order to measure the response times of the
different components we have measured the delays of ter-
minating one single advertisement at a time when there are 1,
100, 200, ., 1000 active calls. This experiment was repeated
100 times, thus, for each queue length, a single advertisement
sessions was revoked 100 times and the mean delay was
calculated. The results of the third scenario are shown inFig. 13 e Mean delay of revoking 5 calls after 5 obligations
were terminated simultaneously.Fig. 12. In this scenario, the total time required to interrupt an
ongoing call is very low because, in the worst case, we
measured a delay of 3 ms, and the maximum delay due to the
PDP is about 2 ms, like in the onA scenario. Hence, the time
interval when the call is still active, although the corre-
sponding right is not valid any longer, is negligible.
The fourth scenario (onB case 2) is similar to the third one.
The only difference is that here user A initiates 5 calls, thus 5
advertisement sessions should be set up at the same time and
be active in parallel with the call sessions. In this scenario,
user A terminates these 5 advertisement sessions at the same
time, so 5 call sessions should be revoked. The measured
times are computed from the moment user A terminates the
first of the 5 advertisement sessions until both the advertise-
ment and the call sessions have been terminated. The average
delay of 100 experiments was calculated. The results of this
scenario are shown in Fig. 13. Here, a worst case total delay of
270 ms is observed, while the PDP delay is between 6.5 and
8 ms. Overall, the obligations experiments have shown that
for 1 session the delays are minimal, both for the preB and for
the onB scenario, i.e., the delay introduced to set up the call is
not perceived by users (without the duration of the adver-
tisement message) and unauthorized calls are interrupted
very quickly. For 5 simultaneous sessions, instead, these de-
lays increase significantly, but this is mainly due to SIP oper-
ations and they are not due to the policy evaluation performed
by the PDP. Indeed, when revoking 5 authorizations, 20 SIP
messages are exchanged through the PEP/Sippy; when
revoking 5 obligations, 35 messages are exchanged. This
causes the large difference between the first and the second
case (Figs. 9 and 13 respectively) since the SIP server is overly
stressed.7. Related work
Previous approaches that incorporate the UCONmodel in SIP/
IMS architectures are Martini et al. (2011); Karopoulos and
Martinelli (2011); Karopoulos et al. (2012), and the work pre-
sented in this article builds upon them. In comparison to
Martini et al. (2011), in the present work the usage control
takes place on the SIP signaling level only and does not involve
media exchange protocols. Karopoulos and Martinelli (2011)
presents an approach for session management based on
UCON for IMS and not purely for SIP. Karopoulos et al. (2012)
concerns authorizations only; here, the whole UCON model
for SIP is implemented.
SIP security is a well researched field covering a wide range
of subjects. One domain covers SIP user identity security and
issues related to it, like identity authentication (Rosenberg
et al., 2002), privacy and anonymity (Peterson, 2002), and
identity hiding (Karopoulos et al., 2011). The deployment of
secure multimedia communications requires secure media
transportation solutions as well. These solutions include the
Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) (Baugher et al.,
2004) which is used in minisip (Minisip, 2013), and ZRTP
(Zimmermann et al., 2011) which is used in Zfone (Zfone,
2013). A lot of research has been devoted to Denial of Service
on SIP based services; an overview of issues and counter-
measures is given in Sisalem et al. (2006). Another issue in SIP
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and Jennings (2008) presents the problem and various
possible solutions.
A SIP server is responsible for Authentication, Authoriza-
tion, and Accounting (AAA). These procedures can be
deployed in two different ways: a) embedded in the SIP server,
and b) in an external server. In the second case, the most
important protocols for the communication between the SIP
server and the external AAA server are RADIUS (Rigney et al.,
2000) and DIAMETER (Fajardo et al., 2012). RADIUS is older and
morewidely deployed than DIAMETER, while both of them are
standardized by the IETF.
The UCON model has been adopted for designing the
authorization system in several other scenarios.
In Zhang et al. (2006, 2008), the inventors of the UCONmodel
describe how it can be adopted in collaborative computing
systems, choosing the Grid environment as reference example.
The proposed architecture is based on a centralized Attribute
repository (AR) for attribute management. The values of the
attributes are submitted to the authorization service by the
user himself (push mode) for immutable attributes, while for
mutable attributes the fresh values are collected by the
authorization service just before their use (pull mode). The
UCON policies are expressed using XACML.
In Martinelli and Mori (2010); Martinelli et al. (2005),
instead, the authors define a process algebra based policy
language, PolPA (the one adopted in this article), tailored for
expressing UCON policies, and they show that all the UCON
core models can be easily expressed. They also show an ar-
chitecture for enforcing UCON policies in the Grid environ-
ment, to protect the providers of computational services from
the applications they execute on behalf of Grid users. PolPA is
also used in the mobile devices scenario (Costa et al., 2010). In
particular, the proposed support performs a runtime moni-
toring of the operations performed by the Java applications
executed on the mobile device.
In Stagni et al. (2009), the UCON model is adopted in Data
Grid, i.e., Grid services that help users discover, transfer, and
manipulate large datasets stored in distributed repositories
and create and manage copies of these datasets. In this case
too, authors used PolPA to express policies.
In Wang et al. (2006) the UCONmodel is adapted to protect
services and devices in ubiquitous computing architectures.
Finally, Teigao et al. (2011); Xu et al. (2007) present an
authorization system for an operating system kernel based on
UCON. In this case, the UCON model is exploited to protect
critical kernel resources such as kernel code, system call table,
interrupt description table.
For further details about the UCON model and its applica-
tions in further scenarios, a general survey is presented in
Lazouski et al. (2010).8. Conclusions and future work
SIP security is a quite wide field and there are several aspects
to be addressed, like confidentiality, integrity, availability;
Section 7 offers insights and directions for finding solutions to
these issues. Our proposal is focused on access control issues
of SIP services and can be used in parallel and transparentlywith the aforementioned solutions in order to create a more
secure SIP environment.
One of the main motivations that led to the proposal
described in this article is that not much work concerning
usage control on multimedia communications services has
been done, despite the fact that Next Generation Networks is a
highly dynamic environment where numerous users perform
many interactions with/through the provided services. Since
those interactions affect both users’ and services’ attribute
values, the enforcement of access control policies should
promptly react to these changes, in order to avoid the
execution or continuation of unauthorized communications.
In particular, the necessity of a new view on access control for
multimedia services mainly stems from the fact that attri-
butes, like user reputation or resource workload, constantly
change with time leading to possible policy violations while a
multimedia session is in progress.
For this reason, this article proposes the adoption of the
UCON model, which can express traditional access control
models as well as new concepts like attributes mutability, con-
tinuity of authorizations and enforcement of obligations. In
order to validate the proposed approach, the article describes a
possible architecture that integrates the UCON authorization
systemwithin thearchitectureofamultimedia service basedon
the SIP protocol, along with a set of examples of usage control
policies that regulate the usage of this service. Moreover, in
order to evaluate the impact on the performance of the multi-
media services, this article also presents an implementation of
theproposed system.The experimental results showed that our
proposal is very efficient evenwith large volumesof active calls,
and therevocationof active calls that break the securitypolicy is
done very quickly. Moreover, by observing the results it can be
deduced that when multiple calls are revoked simultaneously,
then themajor part of the delay is rather due to SIP transactions
thanto PDPprocedures, and this canbealleviatedbyusingmore
than one SIP proxies per domain.
Hence, we conclude that the UCON model can be suc-
cessfully adopted in the multimedia communication services
scenario, because it enhances the service security without
introducing a notable overhead in the system. Regarding the
integration of the proposed Usage Control system within
existing SIP systems, it requires a few modifications to the
original architecture. If the B2BUA component is already
installed in the SIP system, it must be updated to embed the
PEP code; if not, then the B2BUA should be deployed and in-
tegrated by updating the configuration file of the SIP Proxy to
forward all messages to it. Finally, the components of the
Usage Control system, i.e., the PolPA PDP, the PIP and the
Attribute server(s) should be deployed as well.
Our future work includes conducting more experiments
with more complex security policies that are closer to real
systemspolicies.Another aim is to conduct our experiments in
more complex SIP architectures that employ more users and
network elements; for examplemore SIP proxies could be used
for the same or even for different administrative domains. As
future work it is also worth considering the integration of
UCON to other paradigms of multimedia communications,
such asWebRTC. Last but not least, we plan to define a proper
protocol (or to extend an existing one) for the interactions be-
tween the PDP and the PEPs to fully support the UCONmodel,
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